Enter the cyber dragon: understanding Chinese intelligence agencies cyber capabilities by Tobias Feakin
SPECIAL REPORT
June 2013 — Issue 50
Enter the Cyber Dragon  
Understanding Chinese intelligence agencies’  
cyber capabilities
by Tobias Feakin
China’s intelligence services have long 
been underanalyzed as major bureaucratic 
organizations and components of state 
power. This may have mattered relatively 
little during China’s inward‑looking and 
under‑developed years. Today, its leaders 
are significant players on the world stage, 
and understanding how and what they 
learn about the world and how they 
formulate their policy choices is more 
important than ever.1
Espionage, or rather the information 
that it provides, is power, and cyberspace 
enables access to a far more geographically 
unrestricted information pool than do human 
intelligence (HUMINT) methods. The growing 
public attention paid to cyber‑espionage 
throughout 2013 has been remarkable, 
and is marking a distinct shift to raise the 
issue’s priority.
This has been due in large part to two 
elements. First, the ‘Mandiant Report’, a 
US private sector led investigation, publicly 
exposed, in a level of detail rarely seen, one 
of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) cyber‑espionage units that had been 
hacking the New York Times’ computer 
systems during 2012 and 2013. Second, the 
increasing rate of public announcements from 
the highest levels of US Government which 
outline their increased prioritisation of cyber 
issues. This reached a crescendo when the 
issue of cyberattacks was raised in the first 
conversation between President Obama and 
new Chinese President Xi Jinping. The cyber 
issue has been transformed from a low‑order 
technical issue to one of strategic importance.
With the increased public focus on 
cyberattacks, it could be perceived that 
China is the only source of such attacks. Most 
reports wag the finger at ubiquitous ‘Chinese’ 
sources, but give little additional information. 
In fact, most developed and, indeed, many 
developing nations regularly use cyber 
capabilities for espionage. This is an extension 
of traditional espionage, but with fewer risks. 
And there’s a bonus, at least for sophisticated 
attacks it’s very difficult to identify the 
perpetrator. There’s little discussion of the 
advanced state of the Russian Federation’s 
cyber‑espionage efforts, or the fact that the 
US is the most advanced nation, by some 
margin, when it comes to espionage in 
cyberspace.
The spotlight is currently firmly on China, 
but the organisations within China that use 
cyber‑means for information, espionage 
and intelligence purposes remain relatively 
unknown. Aside from the Mandiant Report, 
the media have tended to refer to a generic 
‘Chinese’ hacking source rather than a specific 
agency or other source. This is no doubt due to 
the inherent difficulties in attributing attacks 
and the sensitivities of such direct reporting.
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This paper provides a clearer understanding of 
the key elements of the Chinese intelligence 
agencies that exploit the cyberdomain. It also 
shows that, while cybersecurity is a concern, 
much media coverage tends to oversimplify 
the issue and not present the public with the 
fuller picture.
The development of Chinese cyber 
capabilities
China’s awakening to the value of 
asymmetrical technical capabilities can be 
traced back to the Gulf War in 1990–91. The 
US demonstrated not only its vast military 
superiority to a largely Soviet‑equipped 
military (which in many ways mirrored 
China’s own) but also its capacity for a new, 
different kind of warfare. Computers and 
other high‑end technology provided real‑time 
intelligence and enabled its array of smart 
weaponry. The Chinese military referred to 
the Gulf War as ‘the great transformation’, 
and this led during the rest of the 1990s to a 
great deal of contemplation, reflection and 
discussion in strategic circles about how China 
could adapt to this new battlespace. Various 
Chinese strategic thinkers such as Major 
General Wang Pufeng and Major General Dai 
Qungmin progressed thinking on how China 
could use the cyberdomain, leading to the 
concept of ‘Integrated Network Electronic 
Warfare’. The culmination of this thinking 
led to the 1999 publication of Unrestricted 
Warfare, a book that laid the foundations of 
Chinese thinking on cyber issues. It focused 
on taking advantage of weaknesses created 
by an adversary’s superior conventional 
capabilities, and a great deal on cyber‑means 
for achieving this.2
However, the major current concern of 
policymakers isn’t China’s use of cyber 
capabilities in support of military operations. 
It’s the use of cyberspace for espionage, 
reports of which have been so prevalent in 
the media in 2013, the year when cyber issues 
took on a heightened priority and strategic 
weight. Governments must now work out 
how to handle cyber matters as an element 
of their foreign policy to prevent long‑term 
damage to international relationships.
China is determined to be a leader in 
information and communications technology 
more broadly. It’s adopted a 15‑year 
development strategy (2006–2020) that 
prioritises the ‘informatisation’ of its public 
services and economy and seeks to ensure its 
national security through cyber means.3
Chinese intelligence agencies
In January 2013, the PLA’s Lieutenant General 
Qi Jianguo wrote in the official weekly 
newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party 
Central Party School:
Cybersecurity concerns national 
sovereignty as well as the security of 
economic and social operations, and it 
concerns the quality of human existence. 
The West’s so‑called ‘internet freedom’ 
actually is a type of cyber‑hegemony. 
In the information era, seizing and 
maintaining superiority in cyberspace is 
more important than seizing command of 
sea and command of the air were in World 
War II.4
Qi is responsible for foreign relations and 
intelligence in the PLA, and this was the 
first time he’d put his views on cyber issues 
in the public domain. While those views 
don’t necessarily represent official Chinese 
policy, they encapsulate Chinese sentiment 
about cyberspace.
China’s intelligence services, like those of most 
other countries, are split between civilian and 
military intelligence agencies. However, as 
Nigel Inkster points out, China has no formal 
central mechanism for assessing intelligence 
reports and filtering them into a common 
position for the government to consider.5 In 
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Australia, this function would be carried out 
by the Office of National Assessments, which 
has a statutory role of advising the Prime 
Minister and the National Security Committee 
of Cabinet, as well as coordinating the 
activities of the collection agencies.
This means that the Chinese do not have 
an official way to integrate reporting 
into considered strategic analysis, or the 
ability to distil assessments into a single 
whole‑of‑government view. Chinese 
intelligence agencies, both military and 
civilian, also have components that operate 
at the provincial level, leading to regional 
differences in their analysis, performance and 
equipment. With multiple layers between 
the intelligence sources and China’s leaders, 
it’s probable that what reaches the top levels 
has been influenced by multiple procedures 
and biases, leading to a less reliable finished 
intelligence product.6 It’s important to 
remember that an authoritarian system isn’t 
necessarily a unified and uncompetitive one.
Of the civilian agencies, the Ministry of 
State Security (MSS) is responsible for 
counterespionage, counterintelligence, 
foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence. 
The MSS’s cyber capabilities are relatively 
unknown, but it’s thought to have developed 
them to increase the collection of political 
and economic data on foreign governments, 
non‑government organisations and those 
opposed to the People’s Republic of China, 
all of which are a focus of interest for 
the ministry.7
A second civilian agency, the Ministry of 
Public Security (MPS), has responsibility for 
national policing and, to a lesser degree, 
domestic intelligence.8 The MPS also actively 
supports information security research, 
the certification of commercial products 
for use by the Chinese Government, the 
control of commercial information security 
companies and the funding of academic 
grants. This has included the funding of a 
joint research project between Zhongxing 
Telecommunications Corporation and 
Chongqing University of Posts and 
Telecommunications.9 This is but one example 
where Chinese military and intelligence 
agencies have become involved in the 
corporate sector, blurring the lines between 
the two and their separate objectives.10
There have been many examples of such 
involvement. The one with perhaps the 
highest profile involves Huawei, the Chinese 
telecommunications company. Along with 
Zhongxing Telecommunications Corporation, 
Huawei has been barred on security 
grounds from bidding for US contracts 
and acquisitions. In Australia, it’s been 
banned from involvement in the National 
Broadband Network.11 In a media release, the 
Attorney‑General’s Department stated that 
the decision to exclude Huawei was:
… consistent with the government’s 
practice for ensuring the security 
and resilience of Australia’s critical 
infrastructure … We have a responsibility 
to do our utmost to protect its integrity 
and that of the information carried on it.12
According to a 2012 Economist report, these 
decisions have been made because Huawei’s 
critics believe that: 
it has stolen vast amounts of intellectual 
property and that it has been heavily 
subsidised in its expansion by the Chinese 
government, eager to use it as a Trojan 
horse with which to infiltrate itself into 
more and more foreign networks.13
Military intelligence is the job of the PLA. 
The Second Department of the PLA General 
Staff Department (2PLA) is responsible for 
foreign intelligence gathering, the Defence 
Attaché system, imagery intelligence 
and tactical reconnaissance. The Third 
Department (3PLA) is the primary signals 
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intelligence (SIGINT) collection and analysis 
agency. 3PLA oversees one of the world’s 
largest and most sophisticated SIGINT 
and cybercollection infrastructures, and 
certainly the largest indigenous operation 
in the Asia–Pacific region.14 It manages 
approximately 12 operational bureaus and 
three research institutes and recovers huge 
volumes of data.15 The Fourth Department 
(4PLA) is responsible for electronic warfare, 
countermeasures and computer network 
attack. The key differentiator between 4PLA 
and 3PLA is 4PLA’s offensive mission.
While these divisions of labour appear quite 
straightforward, they’re not. Many of the 
agencies have overlapping responsibilities 
and capabilities. For example, the MSS and 
the MPS are both concerned to some degree 
with internal dissent. Both the MSS and the 
military intelligence agencies are concerned 
with foreign influences and entities in China.
By no means are all cyber‑activities conducted 
from China the work of the intelligence 
agencies.16 Many attacks are rudimentary, 
and China’s large community of patriotic 
‘netizens’—Chinese citizens who take it upon 
themselves to attack targets that question 
the Chinese state and its ideals—could well 
be responsible. One such organisation is the 
Red Hacker Alliance, which comprises some 
300,000 people. There’s no direct PLA control 
over the daily operations of the organisation, 
but rather an overlap of views and ideology. 
The group is tolerated because its activities 
allow plausible deniability and because of the 
benefits of the vast volume of information 
that the state can reap from its members.
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Yet this relationship can sometimes 
backfire. The group has shown an increasing 
willingness to demonstrate its dissatisfaction 
with what it perceives to be slow government 
responses to events by defacing government 
websites. The Chinese Government has 
had to develop ways to communicate with 
these hackers, to influence and attempt to 
stop their activities in these situations, but 
with limited success. The balancing act is 
highly complex. The Red Hacker Alliance 
fears a potential government crackdown on 
what it does, and the government fears a 
hack‑instigated rebellion.17
Types of operations and 
motivations
What types of malicious network operations 
does China conduct, and to what end? While 
presenting evidence to the US Committee 
on Foreign Affairs in 2010, Larry Wortzel, a 
Commissioner of the US–China Economic 
and Security Review Commission, suggested 
that three key operation types predominate. 
Two are relevant to this discussion: those 
for exerting domestic control and those for 
intelligence gathering.
Operations to strengthen political and 
economic control in China
This type of information gathering is used 
to understand what key political dissidents 
are saying, how they use the web, and who 
they communicate with. Another aim is 
to understand who in China is providing 
what’s seen as inflammatory information 
to international media outlets. This was 
exemplified by the New York Times hacking 
incident. The paper was subject to sustained 
hacking for four months, beginning after it 
published a story in October 2012 about Wen 
Jiabao’s relatives accumulating several billion 
dollars through various business dealings 
during his time in power. It was suspected 
that hackers searched for information on who 
the sources of the stories within China were.18
Traditionally, the key targets for such 
attacks have been Chinese democracy 
activists, Tibetans, the Uighur community, 
Falun Gong practitioners and supporters 
of Taiwanese independence, as well as 
others who may paint a negative picture of 
China both at home and abroad. Essentially, 
the cyberdomain has meant that political 
dissidents of any persuasion, who in the past 
were too far away to be reached, can now be 
tracked clandestinely.
Operations to gather economic, political, 
military or technology intelligence and 
information
The aim of these operations is to gather 
information that could accelerate the 
development of the Chinese economy, 
to allow stronger economic negotiating 
positions and market access, to develop and 
field weapons systems, and to save time in 
technology research and development.19
In addition, a great deal of attention is 
paid to gathering information on foreign 
governments and those who comprise 
them. Indeed, it’s been claimed that much 
information is being gathered to create a 
clearer picture of current and future leaders:
They want to arm their diplomats and 
businessmen with the inside scoop to 
be able to expand their political and 
economic allies to help foster ruling elites 
that will never challenge the legitimacy of 
the Chinese Communist regime.20
However, it would be naive to imagine that 
most governments with a foreign intelligence 
collection capability do not accumulate 
information about political elites to 
understand the current and future direction 
of particular countries and how best to 
influence them.
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In the UK, as far back as 2007 Jonathan Evans 
(then the director‑general of MI5) wrote 
privately to 300 chief executives of banks 
and other businesses warning them that 
their IT systems were under attack from 
‘Chinese state organisations’. Subsequently, 
in 2010, MI5 accused China of bugging and 
stealing from UK business executives in order 
to blackmail them into betraying sensitive 
commercial secrets.21 The media often cite 
unrealistically large figures for the value of 
intellectual property theft online. However, 
while IP can be costed, it’s far from clear that 
the value is actually lost.22
One high‑profile case of Chinese economic 
intelligence gathering has been widely 
reported in Australian media. The attempted 
merging of BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, which 
would have created the largest iron ore 
exporter in the world, led to consternation in 
the Chinese mining industries. The Chinese 
were anxious that the merger would create a 
monopoly that would be able to exert greater 
control over the pricing of minerals largely 
exported to China. Subsequently, both BHP’s 
and Rio Tinto’s computer networks were 
penetrated by hackers from China, who were 
gathering information on the merger and on 
Table 1: International cyberattacks reported in the media
Date                                                   Target                                                   Industry                                          Type of attack
Attributed to: Third Department PLA 2nd Bureau
March 2009 Coca‑Cola takeover of China 
Huiyuan Juice Group
Food Spear phishing attack
March 2011 RSA Security firm Spear phishing attack
April 2011 L‑3 Communications Defence contractor Compromised SecurIDs
May 2011 Lockheed Martin Defence contractor Compromised SecurIDs
May 2011 Northrop Grumman Defence contractor Compromised SecurIDs
September 2012 Ongoing – US / Indian 
Government, defence & 
areospace industries
Government/Defence Backdoor Trojan
January 2013 The New York Times Media Advanced Pesistent 
Threat (APT)
Attributed to: Chinese Government/ intelligence
June 2007 Pentagon Government No details
March 2009 BAE Systems Defence contractor APT
Atttibuted to: China
May 2010 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Lobbying APT
June 2011 Google Internet Phishing
August 2011 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Defence contractor APT
October 2011 Japanese diplomatic missions 
(10 countries)
Government APT
January 2012 European Aeronautic Defence 
and Space Company (EADS)
Defence contractor No details
January 2012 Actividentity Smart Cards Security company Backdoor Trojan
June 2012 ThyssenKrupp Defence contractor / Steel No details
October 2012 The New York Times Media Targeted attack
January 2013 Reporters Without Borders Media Watering hole attack
March 2013 Indian Defence Ministry Government Spear phishing attack
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the advisory companies assisting the deal. Not 
long afterwards, the Chinese state‑backed 
company, Chinalco, became active as a 
blocking bidder for Rio Tinto. This led to 
the collapse of the merger and the loss to 
shareholders of potentially millions of dollars 
as a result.23
The gathering of terabytes of economic, 
political, technological and military 
information by the Chinese doesn’t always 
necessarily lead to its successful exploitation. 
For a start, because China doesn’t have a core 
mechanism to pull intelligence together into 
a common government position, much of the 
information will be shelved or not reach those 
who could exploit it most powerfully.
Another danger arises from the autonomy 
that the agencies work with. The central 
leadership lacks control over who perpetrates 
attacks, and where and how attacks are 
made, which could lead to incidents spiralling 
out of control before the leadership can put 
a halt to them. However, a cynic would say 
that the plausible deniability and ‘invisibility 
cloak’ that this offers the central leadership is 
a fortunate coincidence.
It’s also true that stealing information 
isn’t the same as being able to use it. For 
example, during the Cold War, the Soviets 
ended up many generations behind the US in 
computing technology because they couldn’t 
develop equipment that they had copied from 
stolen US blueprints quickly enough. In the 
Chinese case, the success of their operations 
will depend on their ability to convert their 
skills at cloning other’s technology into 
comprehensive research and development 
and a true innovation culture. The shift 
from imitation to innovation will be the true 
challenge for China, and it’s not clear that the 
shift has started yet.
Table 2: Australian cyberattacks reported in the media
Date                                                   Target                                                   Industry                                          Type of attack
Attributed to: China
September 2007 Defence Department + other 
agencies
Government No details
2007/2008 BHP Billiton ‑ Rio Takeover Mining No details
July 2009 Rio Tinto ‑ Stern Hu Mining No details
July 2009 Melbourne International Film 
Festival
Arts Vandalism
April 2010 Fortescue Metals Group Mining No details
April 2010 The Australian Associated 
Press (AAP)
Media Distributed denial of 
service (DDoS)
April 2010 ‘A financial institution in 
Australia’. (Knock‑on effects 
to Optus & News Ltd.)
Financial/Media/
Telecommunication
DDoS
May 2011 Woodside Petroleum Oil and gas No details ‑ ongoing
March 2013 Reserve Bank of Australia Central Bank Malware
Atttibuted to: Chinese Government/ intelligence
April 2010 News Limited Media DDoS
September 2010 BHP ‑ Via Blake, Cassels & 
Graydon LLP + others
Mining/ Law firms Malware
March 2011 Ministerial computers (APH)  
+ Parliament house network
Government Malware
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Conclusions
Current reporting of Chinese intelligence 
operations describes it as working on 
an industrial scale under various named 
approaches to intelligence collection, 
including ‘human wave’, ‘mosaic’ or 
‘thousand grains of sand’. While the 
scale of Chinese cyber‑operations isn’t in 
question, the sophistication of some of 
their methods is. This could offer an insight 
into why they’re caught so frequently. 
There’s no doubt that the US is far more 
powerful and methodologically advanced 
in cyberspace than China. However, Peter 
Mattis has written that perceiving Chinese 
intelligence just in terms of its scale is not 
helpful and detracts from a fuller analytical 
understanding of Chinese intelligence 
capabilities and operations.24 There’s a need 
for a greater understanding of how the 
different intelligence agencies compete with 
one another, how they interact, how they 
formulate useful products and, indeed, how 
frequently this is achieved.
While Chinese intelligence agencies are 
collecting vast quantities of data, what 
happens to it once it’s collected is relatively 
unknown. We’re not certain how the data is 
processed and analysed, and whether it ever 
becomes a fully usable intelligence product 
that’s of value to Chinese policymakers (as 
noted above, China has no equivalent to 
Australia’s Office of National Assessments).25 
We need a clearer understanding of how 
the data is used and collated, but open 
source researchers can only go so far in their 
understanding of this process. It is incumbent 
upon those within the classified world to 
gain a deeper understanding of Chinese 
data collection mechanisms in order to fully 
understand how much practical use is made 
of the data in China’s strategic political and 
economic decisions.
Finally, while China is following a process 
of ‘informatisation’ its own networks are 
becoming increasingly susceptible to network 
attack. It’s often overlooked in the public 
debate that China is highly dependent 
upon cyberspace for its military and civilian 
government programs, and so has just as 
many vulnerabilities to attack as much of 
the Western world, if not more—as Chinese 
diplomats are all too eager to remind us when 
accusations are made against them.
Australian policy implications
The nature and tempo of Chinese 
cyber‑activities have policy implications for 
the Australian Government. This is an issue 
that can’t be ignored: it must be addressed 
in order to build an increasingly mature 
relationship with China. Six policy implications 
for Australia can be identified:
1. Both the US and the UK have ‘called 
out’ China publicly for its cyberattacks. 
Australia needs to work out what its 
public position is on this. At present, it 
doesn’t have one.
2. It’s necessary to engage China in a 
dialogue about cyber issues so that 
some common ground and limitations 
on cyber‑activities can be set out. 
The US and China have agreed to set 
up a working group on cybersecurity 
(announced by US Secretary of State John 
Kerry in April 2013) to try to find common 
purpose on the issue.26 Australia would 
do well to look for similar dialogues 
on cybersecurity with China and other 
regional partners, as this issue will only 
grow in importance over the coming 
years. This is especially important in 
the light of the growing economic 
relationship between Australia and China.
3. The Australian Government must develop 
an updated version of the 2009 Cyber 
Security Strategy as a matter of urgency. 
Enter the Cyber Dragon: Understanding Chinese intelligence agencies’ cyber capabilities 9
In such a rapidly technologically evolving 
environment, it’s unacceptable for such 
a policy to be left without an update for 
four years. A Cyber White Paper, later 
changed to a Digital Economy White 
Paper, was promised for delivery in 
2012, but we’re still awaiting it’s arrival. 
It’s expected that when it does arrive 
it will have a downgraded security 
component. The white paper should 
contain a clear examination of the threat 
picture in cyberspace, in order that both 
government and businesses can prioritise 
the issue accordingly.
4. There’s a need for a government 
statement to provide some clarity on the 
nature of the threat in cyberspace. At 
present, the loudest voice discussing such 
threats is the media.
5. The next major international conference 
on cyberspace, at which nations will look 
to build common ground on cyber issues, 
will take place this year in Seoul. There’s 
a need to develop a coherent Australian 
position for the conference, and that 
position should be representative of both 
the public and the private sectors.
6. We’ve reached a time when cyber 
issues have to be a component of 
government‑to‑government dialogues. 
Those issues are now strategically 
important, so they have to be 
incorporated into the ‘two plus two’ 
ministerial meetings that are taking place 
regionally. In that way, the groundwork 
for common positions that stem 
malicious cyber‑activity can be laid. 
Otherwise, state‑to‑state relationships 
will be damaged.
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